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What constitutes interrogation?: Rhode Island v. Innis' — On May 26,
1974, a taxicab driver in Providence, Rhode Island was robbed by a passenger
carrying a shotgun. 2
 The driver identified his assailant from a photograph as
Thomas Innis.' The Providence police subsequently mounted a search
resulting in Innis's arrest.* Upon apprehension the arresting officer advised
Innis of his rights as required by Miranda v: Arizona.' Minutes later, a police
sergeant arrived at the arrest scene and gave Innis the Miranda warnings. 6
Almost immediately thereafter, Police Captain Leyden arrived and provided
Innis with his third set of warnings.' Innis told the police that he understood
these rights and wished to speak with a lawyer'
Captain Leyden instructed three officers, Patrolmen Gleckman, McKen-
na and Williams, to escort the suspect to the central police station. 9 The
policemen transported Innis in a four-door vehicle with a wire screen between
the front and rear seats." Shortly after the trip to the station got underway,"
Officer Gleckman initiated a conversation with Officer McKenna in which he
mentioned the presence of a school for handicapped children in the area."
Patrolmen Gleckman expressed deep concern that the youngsters at the school
might discover a weapon with shells and that they might injure themselves with
it.' 3
 According to Officer Williams, Gleckman displayed a particular worry
that a little girl "would pick up the gun and maybe kill herself."'* Innis then
interrupted, asking the officers to turn back so that he could locate the
weapon. 15
Upon returning to the scene of the arrest, the respondent received a fourth
set of Miranda warnings from Captain Leyden." Innis informed the police that
he clearly understood these rights, but indicated that he wished to find the
weapon because of the danger to the local school children." He then brought
the police to the shotgun, which was located nearby."
' 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
2 Id. at 293.
Id.
* Id. at 293-94. The suspect was unarmed at the time of the arrest, and offered no
resistance.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 446 U.S. at 294.
7 Id.
e Id.
9 Id.
'° Id. The trial court, faced with conflicting testimony, made no determination about
the seating location of Officer Gleckman in the vehicle,
" Brief for Appellee at 6. The vehicle had, in fact, traveled only approximately a mile
from the arrest scene before Innis asked the officers to return, Id. at 7.
12
 446 U.S. at 294.
" Id. at 294-95.
" Id.
13 Id.
DS Id.
' 7 Id.
1 ° Id.
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Two months after Innis's arrest a grand jury returned an indictment
charging him with the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of another taxicab
driver. 19 The defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress as evidence the
shotgun and his statements concerning the weapon." The trial court found
that the police had sufficiently advised Innis of his Miranda rights and that the
officers in the police vehicle with him merely were voicing to each other an
understandable concern for the children." Accordingly, the court decided that
Innis had made a clear and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights." The pros-
ecution introduced the evidence in controversy at Innis's trial, and the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts."
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court set aside Innis's conviction
in a 5-2 decision." The court found that the officers indeed had interrogated
the defendant without obtaining a waiver of his right to. counsel, thereby
violating Miranda requirements. 25
 The court reasoned that although the officers
had not addressed the suspect directly, they had coerced him in such a way as
to constitute an interrogation for Miranda purposes. 26 Having ruled that both
the shotgun and related testimony were obtained unconstitutionally by the
Providence police, the court granted Innis a new trial."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider for the
first time the meaning of "interrogation" under Miranda v. Arizona. 29 In a 6-3
decision," the Court vacated the state supreme court's decision and HELD: an
interrogation occurs only when police officers employ words or actions that
they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response." Based on this definition of interrogation, the Supreme Court de-
cided that Innis had not been interrogated, and thus that his constitutional
rights had not been violated."
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, acknowledged that the protec-
tions articulated in Miranda apply not only to police interrogations that con-
19 Id. John Mulvaney, a Providence taxicab driver, had been murdered less than a
week before Innis's arrest. Mulvaney had been killed by a shotgun blast to the back of the head.
Id. at 293.
20 Id. at 295-96.
21
 Id. at 296. The decision of the trial court is unreported.
22 Id.
" Id.
24 State v. Innis,	 R.I.	 391 A.2d 1158 (1978).
" Id. at	 , 391 A.2d at 1162.
" Id. at	 , 391 A.2d at 1162-63.
27 	at	 391 A.2d at 1167.
" 440 U.S. 934 (1978).
29 Justice Stewart's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. 446 U.S. at 293-304. Justice White filed a separate concur-
ring opinion, as did the Chief Justice. Id. at 304-05. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in
an opinion written by Justice Marshall. Id. at 305-06. Justice Stevens dissented, but on different
grounds. Id. at 307-17.
3° Id. at 302.
31
 Id. at 302-04.
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stitute express questioning of a suspect in custody," but also to situations
where a person in custody is subjected to the "functional equivalent" of ex-
press questioning." The Court emphasized, however, that police should not be
held responsible for unforeseeable results that may arise from their words or ac-
tions." It reasoned that to hold law officers so accountable would do nothing to
promote protection of a suspect's rights, and would make it difficult to employ
normal police procedure. Miranda warnings, then, are required only when the
policemen involved should know that their conduct is "reasonably likely"" to
bring forth an incriminating response from the suspect.'" Thus, the majority
concluded that a finding of non-deliberate "subtle compulsion," as perceived
by the suspect, is not by itself sufficient to constitute a "custodial
interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, ex-
pressed basic agreement with the Court's definition of interrogation. He read
this definition to encompass any situation in which police conduct is intended
to obtain a response." He stated, however, that the standard was applied in-
correctly to the facts of the case. 39 Justice Marshall maintained that Officer
Gleckman obviously was attempting to appeal to Innis's conscience and that
the police were responsible for the "pressures to speak" brought to bear upon
the suspect in this instance. 40 Therefore, he objected not to the general stand-
ard adopted by the Innis majority, but instead to the particular result reached
in this case. Justice Stevens also filed a dissent,*' which expressed basic
philosophical differences with the majority's definition of interrogation which
had not concerned Justice Marshall. The Stevens opinion proposed an alter-
native definition of interrogation42
 which was very much at variance with
Justice Stewart's.
This majority standard indicated that, in assessing whether police officers
had "interrogated" a suspect, police knowledge of that suspect's unique per-
sonal characteristics could be taken into account. 43 This concept makes the law
enforcement officer's perception determinative." Thus, the protection of a
32 Id. at 300-01.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 301-02.
" Id. at 302.
36 Id.
" Id. at 303. The Court conceded that the policemen's remarks "struck a responsive
cord [sic]" with the suspect, but ruled that this "is not the end of the inquiry." Id.
38 Id. at 305.
39 Id. at 305-07. Justice Marshall expressed the opinion that this decision was "simply
an aberration" in the application of the Court's standard. Id. at 307.
49 Id.
" Id.
42 It at 311.
" Id. at 302 n.8.
44 Id. at 301-02. Although police intent is not the critical element in an interrogation
under the Court's standard, its definition hinges on whether particular police officers can foresee
the outcome of their behavior.
1180	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:1177
given suspect's constitutional rights is entrusted to the arresting policeman,
who may very possibly be unaware of that suspect's particular weaknesses or
susceptibilities. The Innis decision evinces a continuation of the Burger Court's
extremely narrow interpretation of Miranda, and of the Court's unwillingness
to view Miranda as establishing the primacy of the suspect's perspective in the
custodial situation.
The purpose of this casenote is to demonstrate that the Innis Court's em-
phasis on police perceptions both undercuts traditional constitutional protec-
tions afforded to suspects, and may be extremely difficult for courts to apply. In
addition, it will suggest an alternative approach in this area. Toward these
ends, the casenote will first examine those sections of Miranda that deal with in-
terrogation in order to show the intention of the Miranda Court in providing
safeguards to the suspect. Next, it will examine the Burger Court's limitations
on the Miranda holding, with particular emphasis on Harris v. New York" and
Michigan v. Tucker. 46 The case of Brewer v. Williams47 will be scrutinized in the
context of this line of cases and Rhode Island v. Innis. The discussion will then
turn to the Court's holding in Innis in light of the trend displayed in this series
of post-Miranda decisions. Finally, the casenote will assess the practicality and
potential difficulties in implementing the Innis majority's definition of inter-
rogation and suggest a potentially more appropriate standard.
I. MIRANDA: RELIEF FOR THE ACCUSED
The Warren Court's holding in Miranda v. Arizona" signaled a dramatic
recognition of the need for definite and effective measures designed to preserve
an individual's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Certain
decisions preceding Miranda had indicated an increased judicial regard for the
rights of the accused. 49 Miranda, however, provided a breadth of protection for
these rights that previous decisions had lacked, and it actually established a list
of specific safeguards" to be observed scrupulously by law enforcement agents.
" 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
46 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
" 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964).
5° 384 U.S. at 444-45. The safeguards were spelled out by the Miranda Court in this
fashion:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to re-
main silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an at-
torney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is
alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some
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The Court deemed these safeguards necessary to protect the individual suspect
from the inherently intimidating aspects of the custodial interrogation situa-
tion. 51
 For example, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, placed great
emphasis on the claustrophobic nature of custodial interrogation and the sense
of isolation that the suspect feels. 52
 The Court expressly stated that it was con-
cerned primarily with the evils that can emerge from the interrogation at-
mosphere and its built-in "badge of intimidation." 53
Although the Court referred extensively to the traditional in-station direct
questioning form of interrogation, it did not ignore subtler police techniques of
eliciting information. Indeed, the Miranda Court noted several psychological
techniques in which police do not question or even directly address the suspect.
These include the "reverse line-up," in which a pre-coached witness points out
the suspect during a break in questioning. 54
 In another technique, the so-called
"Mutt and Jeff" act, a kindly and solicitous policeman asks the suspect for
cooperation so that he can get an unpleasant and threatening fellow officer
removed from the case." These measures are designed to coerce the suspect in-
to making an expedient confession. The Court imposed the same constitutional
restrictions on this type of behavior as it did on traditional methods of inter-
rogation, since the impact of the police conduct on the suspect is identical in
each case." The Miranda Court, then, took a widely-encompassing view of
police interrogation in all of its aspects, both obvious and subtle.
Miranda was a landmark decision because the Court had never before
demonstrated such concern for the suspect's fears and apprehensions. The deci-
sion viewed the interrogation environment from the suspect's perspective, and
attempted to eliminate those aspects of the environment that may prey upon
the suspect's mind and lead him to incriminate himself. It set out to provide the
accused wrongdoer with sufficient safeguards against any undue mental
pressure caused by the interplay of police custody and police interrogation. At
no point in the opinion was police perception of the situation a significant con-
sideration. Instead, the Court defined and used the entire concept of interroga-
tion solely in terms of the perceptions and experiences of the suspect."
questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Id.
" Id. at 478.
62 Id. at 448-50.
63
 Id, at 457.
" Id. at 452-54.
" Id.
56 Id. The Court indicated that even in the absence of physical brutality or the use of
specific psychological ploys, "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on in-
dividual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." Id.
" See generally id. at 448-58. The Miranda Court stressed the need to develop protections
to "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings." Id.
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II. AN UNEASY ALLIANCE: THE BURGER COURT AND MIRANDA
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger has demonstrated a
distinct lack of enthusiasm for the Miranda doctrine. 58 While the Burger Court
has not excluded evidence based directly on the authority of Miranda, 59 it has
interpreted the Miranda holding so narrowly that it effectively has eradicated
much of the decision's practical application. Although the Court has had
several opportunities to deal with Miranda, two cases, Harris v. New York and
Michigan v. Tucker, best exemplify the extent to which the Burger Court has
removed the teeth from the Miranda doctrine. In particular, these cases
demonstrate the Court's shift from Miranda's emphasis on the suspect's rights
in the interrogation setting, to a point of view more concerned with the law's
need for incriminating evidence.
A. Harris v. New York
The Burger Court first dealt with Miranda in Harris v. New York." This
case presented the question whether statements obtained without proper Mir-
anda procedural safeguards could be introduced at trial to impeach the
credibility of the defendant's testimony." The defendant, Harris, was arrested
for selling heroin to an undercover officer. 62 The arresting officer failed to in-
form the suspect of his right to appointed counsel before addressing questions
to him." In the course of the interrogation, Harris made several incriminating
statements." At trial, the prosecution made no effort to introduce these
statements as part of its case in chief." Harris, however, took the stand to deny
the sales of heroin that had been alleged by police officers in earlier
testimony. 66 On cross-examination, the prosecution confronted Harris with
58 Warren Burger became Chief justice on June 23, 1969. Since the beginning of Chief
Justice Burger's term Justices Black, Douglas and Harlan have departed, while Justices Powell,
Rehnquist and Stevens have joined the Court. Justice Burger's influence certainly has not been
determinative in all matters that the Court has considered since the beginning of his term. In this
instance, however, Justice Burger's influence, along with that of the other justices appointed by
President Nixon, has had a significant impact on the Court's decision-making. Justices Harlan,
Stewart and White had dissented in Miranda, and the latter two Justices have, generally, along
with the Nixon-appointed Justices, not voted to exclude evidence on the basis of Miranda. See
generally Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, THE SUP. CT. REV. 99-101 (1977).
39 Id. at 100-01. The Burger Court, prior to Innis, had handed down the following deci-
sions that concerned the "scope and application" of the Miranda doctrine: Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714
(1975); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976);
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564
(1976); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); United
States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
60 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
61 M.
62 Id. at 222-23.
63 Id. at 224.
64 Id. at 223. These statements partially contradicted Harris's trial testimony. Id.
65 Id. at 223-24.
66 Id. at 223.
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statements made by him during interrogation that contradicted parts of his
testimony." The trial judge allowed the prosecutor to use these statements, but
instructed the jury to consider them in determining the issue of Harris's
credibility, and not as evidence of his guilt. 68
 Harris was convicted," and the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed."
In a 5-4 decision, 71
 the United States Supreme Court also affirmed, ruling
that the statements in controversy were used in a permissible manner." Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, conceded that parts of the Miranda
opinion could be interpreted as prohibiting the use of such statements for any
purpose." Nevertheless, he maintained that such dicta were "not at all
necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling." As
a result, he held that Miranda did not pose a broad obstacle to the introduction
of evidence for impeachment purposes." The Court recognized that Miranda
protections act as a shield for the suspect by proscribing the use of statements
obtained as evidence in derogation of Miranda. 76
 The Court concluded,
however, that this shield is not absolute and that it takes effect only when the
prosecution attempts to offer such evidence for the purpose of proving the
defendant's guilt. 77
 The shield is not available to the defendant as a vehicle for
precluding impeachment of his own testimony, the Court reasoned, because
Miranda was not designed to protect a defendant who perjures himself." In this
circumstance, the prosecution can rely on wrongfully obtained evidence to im-
peach the defendant."
It is difficult to reconcile both the actual language and the spirit of Miranda
with the conclusions reached in Harris. The Miranda holding stated that the
prosecution "may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory "80
obtained without the use of the Court's required procedural safeguards. 81
Unlike Harris, the Miranda decision did not distinguish the use of such
statements for purposes of impeachment from offering them for purposes of
proof. Indeed, the Miranda Court considered the use of exculpatory statements
67 Id.
66 Id.
69 People v. Harris, 31 A.D.2d 828 (1968).
70 People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1968).
'' 401 U.S. at 222. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion was joined by Justices
Harlan, Stewart, White and Blackmun. Id. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion, in which
Justices Douglas and Marshall joined. Id. at 226.
72 Id.
" Id. at 224.
74 Id.
" Id. at 226.
76 Id. at 225.
" Id. at 225-26. The Court believed that, with respect to the deterrent effect of the ex-
clusionary rule, "sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable
to the prosecution in its case in chief." Id. at 225.
" Id. at 226.
" Id.
8° 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
See note 50 supra.
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to impeach a defendant's testimony, and ruled explicitly that such statements
"may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for
any other statement." 82 That Court emphasized that the constitutional issue in
Miranda was the admissibility of statements obtained in the absence of required
safeguards." The Miranda Court refused to condition the admissibility of such
statements on the purpose for which they were offered." Thus, the Miranda
Court's primary concern was to keep improperly obtasined evidence out of
court entirely." Consequently, when Justice Burger stated in Harris that these
portions of Miranda were not controlling," he effectively announced a clear and
decisive turning point in the Supreme Court's approach to fifth amendment
self-incrimination cases.
The brevity of the Harris opinions' is itself significant in light of the impor-
tance of the constitutional issues involved. By taking only a few brief
paragraphs to reduce the crucial element of Miranda which demanded total ex-
clusion of wrongfully-obtained statements from the courtroom to mere dicta,"
the Court signaled its distaste for the broad protections espoused in the earlier
case. The Court obviously did not find it necessary to go to great lengths in
order to distinguish Miranda. In Harris, it demonstrated a diminishing concern
for how evidence is obtained by the police, and a greater interest in the trust-
worthiness of the evidence itself." The Harris majority was interested primarily
in ensuring that the prosecution would be hampered as little as possible by a
suspect's invocation of Miranda protections." Harris, then, constituted the first
major step away from Miranda's preoccupation with the rights of the suspect in
a custodial interrogation, and toward a heightened regard for the needs of law
enforcement officials.
B. Michigan v. Tucker
The Burger Court dealt an equally dramatic blow to Miranda's vitality in
Michigan v. Tucker,'" decided several years after Harris. Tucker was arrested for
rape and informed by the police of his right to remain silent and of his right to
counsel, but not of his right as an indigent to have counsel appointed." An in-
terrogation commenced, and Tucker explained, by way of an alibi, that he had
" 384 U.S. at 477.
83 Id. at 445.
" See generally id. at 476-79.
" Id. at 476. The Court made it clear that the privilege against self-incrimination pro-
tects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it did not
distinguish degrees of incrimination. Id.
86 401 U.S. at 224.
" The majority opinion is barely three pages long.
BB Id. at 224.
89 Id. at 225. The Harris Court stressed that "[Ole impeachment process here un-
doubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility. . . ." Id.
9° Id.
91 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
92 Id. at 436.
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been with one Henderson at the time of the rape." The police located Hender-
son, who discredited Tucker's account of his whereabouts." Henderson also
provided the authorities with evidence that further incriminated the suspect."
Tucker unsuccessfully attempted to exclude Henderson's testimony from his
trial, on the grounds that the police had obtained the latter's identity in viola-
tion of Tucker's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination." The de-
fendant was found guilty, and his conviction was affirmed by the Michigan
Court of Appeals" and the Michigan Supreme Court." Tucker sought and
received habeas corpus relief in federal district court." That court ruled
Henderson's testimony inadmissible, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 'Q° The Supreme Court, in a 8-1 decision,'°' reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit, ruling the disputed testimony admissible. 102
 Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, took the opportunity to erode further Miranda's constitutional
basis.
The Tucker Court first characterized the fifth amendment as designed to
guard against traditional and brutally compulsive methods of interrogation. 103
It then found that the interrogation of Tucker did not conform to this "Star
Chamber" model.'" Consequently, the Court decided that the police did not
violate Tucker's privilege against self-incrimination by failing to inform him of
his right to appointed counsel, but instead, merely acted in disregard of a "pro-
phylactic"'" standard designed to protect that right. 106 The Tucker Court failed
to acknowledge that Miranda was at least as concerned with modern police
methods of eliciting information through subtler psychological means 1 " as it
" Id.
" Id. at 436-37.
Id. Henderson conceded that he had been with Tucker on the night of the crime, but
maintained that Tucker had left rather early. He also related to the police details of a conversa-
tion between him and Tucker which took place the day following the rape, in which Henderson
questioned Tucker about scratches on the latter's face. Tucker intimated that he had received the
marks during an encounter with a woman who lived nearby. Id.
96 Id. at 437.
97
 People v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W.2d 712 (1969).
98
 People v. Tucker, 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971).
99
 Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
'°° Tucker v. Johnson, 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973) (summary decision).
'° 1
 417 U.S. at 434. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell
joined. Id. Justice Stewart and Justice Brennan each filed concurring opinions, as did Justice
White. Id. at 453, 461. Justice Douglas dissented. Id. at 461.
102 Id. at 451.
"3 Id. at 439-40. Justice Rehnquist argued that to determine the "scope" of the right
against self-incrimination, it was necessary to "hark back to the historical origins of the
privilege." Id. Needless to say, the notorious religious inquisitions of days gone by had employed
rather overtly physical means. Id.
101 Id. at 449. The Court emphasized that "[t]he pressures on respondent to accuse
himself were hardly comparable even with the least prejudical of those pressures which have been
dealt with in our cases." Id.
'°' Id. at 439.
106 Id. at 444.
107 384 U.S. at 448-55. The Miranda Court recognized that "the modern practice of in-
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was with more obviously abusive techniques. 108 Further, Justice Rehnquist
emphasized in Tucker that the specific warnings set forth in Miranda' 09 were not
constitutional rights in themselves, but rather, were judicially created devices
intended to protect the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination in a custodial situation.h 10
Again, it is difficult to interpret the Tucker decision as consistent with the
spirit and intent of Miranda. A close reading of the Miranda opinion reveals that
the procedural safeguards developed by the majority are much more than
recommended methods. " The holding stated that the procedures must be
employed "unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exer-
cise it. . . ."" 2 Additionally, the Miranda Court noted that police are obligated
not to take advantage of a suspect's indigence.'" In contrast, the Tucker Court
deemed that the right of an indigent to have counsel appointed was relatively
unimportant." 4
 Further, it did not suggest that the police had developed effec-
tive alternative methods of securing this right."' The Court's principal con-
cern was not protecting the suspect's constitutional rights, but "making
available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence
that either party seeks to adduce." 116
 Thus, the Court's focus was again drift-
ing away from the suspect and toward the prosecution's need for evidence.
custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented." Id. at 448.
Id, at 445-46.
109 See note 50 supra.
"° 417 U.S. at 444.
11 The Miranda opinion expressed the need for and desirability of judicial action in pro-
viding specific safeguards. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, declared that:
In any event ... the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be
determined by the courts. . , Judicial solutions to problems of constitutional
dimension have evolved decade by decade. As courts have been presented with the
need to enforce constitutional rights, they have found means of doing so. . . .
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule mak-
ing or legislation which would abrogate them.
384 U.S. at 490-91,
112 Id. at 444.
1 " 384 U.S. at 472. The Miranda Court stressed that "[Elbe warning of a right to counsel
would be hollow if it was not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent — the person
most often subjected to interrogation — the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel
present." Id. at 473.
114 417 U.S. at 446-50. Justice Rehnquist stated that before the Court could undertake
to penalize police error, it must be established that "the sanction serves a valid and useful pur-
pose." Id. at 446. In this case, the majority found that because the police error had occurred prior
to the Miranda decision, exclusion of the evidence in controversy would have no deterrent effect
on future police conduct, as the police were now fully apprised of Miranda and its ramifications.
Id. at 447-48. In addition, Justice Rehnquist stated that the trustworthiness of the evidence had
been fully and fairly determined at Tucker's trial. Id. at 449. Therefore, the Court concluded
that there was no persuasive reason to enforce judicially the particular right ignored by the police,
especially in light of the lack of "pressure" on the suspect in this case. Id. at 449-50.
The majority opinion in Tucker emphasized the relative unimportance of the right
itself, rather than potential alternatives to the particular procedural safeguards put forth in
Miranda, See note 104 supra.
115 411 U.S. at 450. The Tucker Court balanced this interest against that of the suspect
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III. INTERROGATION IN A SIXTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT:
BREWER v. WILLIAMS
Brewer v. Williams" 7 provides an intriguing bridge between the Burger
Court's series of post-Miranda decisions, and Rhode Island v. Innis. It dealt with
the interrogation problems raised by Miranda, and contained a fact situation
extremely similar to that of Innis. Williams was arrested in Davenport, Iowa for
the Christmas Eve kidnapping of a young girl (whom the police suspected had
been subsequently murdered) in Des Moines, Iowa. 18 He spoke with attorneys
in both cities, who advised him not to make any statements until meeting with
his lawyer upon his return to Des IVIoines." 9 Williams was escorted from
Davenport to Des Moines by two police officers.'" During this trip, Officer
Learning, seated next to the suspect in the back of the vehicle, initiated a con-
versation with Williams.' 2 ' The officer knew Williams to be a former mental
patient and a deeply religious individual and asked him to consider a few mat-
ters. 122 Learning pointed out that a family had had their little girl taken from
them on Christmas Eve, that the least they could hope for was to give their
daughter a Christian burial, and that the police car would be passing the area
where the body was located.' 23 Detective Learning intimated that if they did
not stop and locate the body before the predicted snowstorm, the corpse might
never be found. 124 The officer then told Williams not to reply to what he had
said, but to think it over as they drove along."' While still en route to Des
Moines, Williams provided the police with incriminating information and
ultimately led them to the girl's body. 126
The trial court' 27 and the Iowa Supreme Court' 28 both found that
Williams validly had waived his right to counsel. Williams was convicted of
kidnapping and murder, and the State Supreme Court upheld his conviction
and found that the societal interest in this case was the considerably stronger of the two. Id. at
450-51.
'" 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Interesting and enlightening articles concerning Brewer and
pertinent interrogation questions include Kamisar, Brewer u. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda:
What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978); Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v.
Williams — A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977); and Graham, What is
"Custodial Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda u. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 59 (1966).
18 430 U.S. at 390.
119
 Id. at 390 - 91.
120 Id. at 391. Officer Learning and a fellow officer had traveled from Des Moines to
Davenport to pick up Williams. Id.
121
 Id, at 392.
122 Id.
' 23 Id. at 392-93.
'4 Id. at 393.
125 Id.
'" Id.
127 The decision of the trial court is unreported. Id. at 394 n.2. The trial judge found
that the evidence had been obtained from Williams during "a critical stage in the proceedings re-
quiring the presence of counsel on his request," but that the defendant had "waived his right to
have an attorney present during the giving of such information." Id. at 394.
126 State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1972).
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on appeal.' 29 Williams petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district court,'"
which ruled that he had been denied his previously asserted right to counsel
during his automobile trip, and that he had not waived this right.' 3 ' Brewer was
argued on both fifth and sixth amendment grounds at every level, and all of the
lower tribunals took Miranda into account to some degree in deciding the case.
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,'" affirmed the judg-
ment of the federal district court.'" Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
found that an interrogation occurred because Detective Learning "deliberately
and designedly set out to elicit information" 134 from Williams in giving the
'Christian burial speech." 135
This decision, however, did not herald any renewed enthusiasm for Mir-
anda in the Burger Court, because it was based solely on sixth and fourteenth
amendment grounds.'" In light of the custodial interrogation in Brewer, it is
very odd that the Court did not dispose of the case based on Miranda or even
mention Miranda in the course of its opinion. 137 The omission of Miranda is even
more striking in light of Brewer's procedural history.
That the Court was inconsistent in dealing with interrogation cases is
demonstrated further by its treatment of Rhode Island o. Innis. Although Innis
presented an interrogation situation similar to Brewer, the Court nevertheless
based its decision on the fifth amendment rather than the sixth amendment.'"
The pattern which emerges is that of a Court extremely reluctant to exclude
evidence of great probative value on the authority of Miranda. Despite the
parallels in the fact situations of the two cases,'" the Court developed two con-
ceptually distinct doctrines for disposing of interrogation cases: one rooted in
129 Id.
13° Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
' 31 Id. at 178-79.
1S2 430 U.S. at 388. Justice Stewart's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Powell and Stevens. Id. Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens each filed concurring opin-
ions. Id. at 406, 409, 414. Chief Justice Burger dissented. Id. at 415. Justice White also dissented
in an opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Id. at 429. Justice Blackmun filed a
separate dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. Id. at 438.
13 Id. at 406.
"4 Id. at 399.
135 Id. at 392. The briefs and oral arguments of the parties used this term to refer to
Detective Learning's discourse to Williams. Id.
136 Id, at 397-98.
" 7 Id. at 397. Justice Stewart referred to Miranda only once in the course of his opinion,
and only for the purpose of stating that "there is no need to review in this case the doctrine of
Miranda v. Arizona, a doctrine designed to secure the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.. . ." Id.
138 446 U.S. at 293. In sharp contrast with Brewer, where he had found no need to con-
sider Miranda at all, 430 U.S. at 398-99, in his Innis opinion Justice Stewart dealt only with fifth
amendment, Miranda considerations. Justice Stewart insisted that the sole issue in Innis was
whether the suspect was "interrogated" in violation of Miranda standards. 446 U.S. at 293.
139
 See 430 U.S. at 392-93, 446 U.S. at 294-95. In both cases policemen were escorting
custodial suspects to the station in official police vehicles, in both instances the police made
remarks which touched the suspect's conscience or concern for others, and as a result the respec-
tive suspects provided the police with significant incriminating information. Id.
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the sixth amendment, the other in the fifth amendment. This division provides
the Court with a means of avoiding the exclusion of evidence based on Miranda.
The Brewer Court, then, deliberately chose not to exclude evidence on the
authority of Miranda, even in a case where the opportunity to do so clearly
presented itself. As a result, the trend evidenced in Harris and Tucker was al-
lowed to continue unabated, and Miranda's efficacy in safeguarding the fifth
amendment rights of the suspect remained in decline. Rhode Island v. Innis,
then, provided a significant opportunity for the Court to further eviscerate
Miranda. This case, centering as it did on the implication of police behavior in
the presence of a suspect held in custody, enabled the Court to present its own
interpretation of the custodial situation. This interpretation proved to be
significantly different from that of the Miranda Court.
IV. RHODE ISLAND v, INNIS: A CLOSER LOOK
Through examining Rhode Island v. Innis in some detail, it is possible to
demonstrate the precise nature of the case's holding, and the potential effect
this holding may have. By the time Innis came before the Court, Miranda had
been undercut in a number of ways.'" The Court has held that statements ob-
tained without proper Miranda warnings were admissible for impeachment pur-
poses, 14 ' and that Miranda warnings were not rights in themselves, but were in-
stead merely prophylactic devices.'" The Court then seized the opportunity in
Innis to continue its gradual rejection of Miranda's suspect-oriented approach in
favor of a police-oriented view. The Court had options available in deciding
how to dispose of this case. The majority could have reversed the Rhode Island
Supreme Court primarily on sixth amendment grounds. The Court, neverthe-
less, chose to decide the case solely on the basis of its fifth amendment conclu-
sion that no interrogation had taken place.'" The Court focused on Miranda in
this case, where crucial evidence was admitted, in sharp contrast to Brewer,
where evidence was excluded without mention of Miranda. Thus, Justice
Stewart's Innis opinion demonstrated the state of disrepute into which Miranda
has fallen in the current Court.
The Innis Court held that Miranda "interrogation" included not only ex-
press questioning, but also all police words or actions that "the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. "144
 The holding excluded from this definition words or actions "nor-
mally attendant to arrest and custody," 146
 but did not specify or give examples
of such behavior. 146
 In deference to Miranda the Innis opinion purports to focus
'" See text at notes 60-116 supra.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
1 " Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
1 " 446 U.S. at 303-04.
1 " Id. at 301.
' 4' Id.
145 Id. It is doubtful that the Court would include the police behavior in Innis under this
particular exception, as the Court found that the remarks were not part of a routine, but instead
were spontaneous expressions of concern. Id, at 303.
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part of its definition on the suspect's perceptions."' The Court's standard in-
dicates, however, that an interrogation takes place only when the police
themselves perceive that the likely result of their words or actions will be an in-
criminating response from the suspect.'" Thus, the critical elements in the
standard are police evaluation of the susceptibility of suspects in general, and
police knowledge of the peculiar susceptibilities of specific individual
suspects.'"
In Innis, as in Brewer, the Court was asked to examine the content of police
statements to determine whether an interrogation was conducted in violation of
the suspect's constitutional rights.'" Even assuming that in Brewer Williams
was "interrogated" within the meaning of Innis, however, it is impossible to
match neatly the facts of Brewer and Innis and conclude with certainty that Innis
was so interrogated. Most significantly, the "interrogating" officer in Brewer
knew of the suspect's particular beliefs and idiosyncracies, and made use of this
knowledge in speaking to the suspect."' Further, the officer directly addressed
his remarks to the suspect 152 and was a veteran of the police force, with years of
experience in interrogation techniques."' Finally, the officer acknowledged
that his primary purpose in "conversing" with Williams was to elicit informa-
tion.'" None of these elements of the Brewer "interrogation" were present in
the Innis situation.' 55 Nevertheless, the Court found that it had to emphasize
other factors in reaching its decision.
In finding Brewer inapplicable to the case before it, the Innis Court noted
that the Providence officers knew of no particular interest on Innis's part in
handicapped children, 1 S 6 whereas Detective Learning in Brewer had possessed
knowledge of the suspect's unique religious interests. The Court considered
this to be a significant distinction between Brewer and Innis in determining
whether police conduct was likely to elicit an incriminating response.'" Inbau
and Reid, the authors of widely-read police interrogation manuals and ar-
ticles'" on the subject, however, recommend appeals to the suspect's con-
science and sense of morality for effective interrogation. Thus, the police in In-
nis may have had more reason to expect a response from the suspect than the
147 Id. at 301.
' 4" Id.
'" Id. at 302-03.
' 5° Id. at 293. See text at notes 134-38 supra.
15 1 430 U.S. at 392-93.
' 52 Id. at 392-93.
1 " See Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer o. Williams — A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66
CEO. L.J. 209, 211, 215-33 (1977).
155 430 U.S. at 399.
'" 446 U.S. at 294-95.
'" Id. at 302.
'" Id. at 302-03. The Court stressed that the Innis conversation apparently consisted of
no more than a few off-hand remarks, and that "[t]his is not a case in which the police carried on
a lengthy harangue in the presence of the suspect." Id.
158 See, e.g., F. INBAIJ AND J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2d
ed. 1967); INBAU AND REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1953).
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Court might have imagined. An appeal to save the lives of unfortunate young
people has an almost universal impact on human consciences. The image of a
small handicapped girl destroying herself with a shotgun imparts an obvious
emotional effect that would vitiate the need for police knowledge of specific sen-
sitivity of a suspect to such remarks.
Another possible distinction between Brewer and Innis is that the Innis of-
ficers never directly addressed the respondent in the course of their custodial
ride together. 1" Making the direct approach a prerequisite to a finding of inter-
rogation would lead to a concerted shift by police to subtler, but no less effec-
tive, means of eliciting information from suspects.'" The Miranda Court noted
the availability of several alternative methods of interrogation, including
changes in vocal inflection and nonverbal communication.` 61 Consequently, by
failing to address Innis personally, the officers did not preclude a finding of
"interrogation."
These results, therefore, necessitate a consideration of the actual intent
and purpose behind the conversation of the Providence policemen regarding
weapons and retarded children. Intent was an important concept in both Brewer
and Innis .t 62 Unlike Officer Learning in Brewer, the Innis officers did not
acknowledge any intent to extract information from the suspect."' While the
trial court made no finding as to whether their remarks were made to elicit a
response from Innis,'" the Rhode Island Supreme Court suggested the
presence of intent in the officers' conversation.' 65
 Nevertheless, the United
States Supreme Court accepted the proposition that the policemen merely were
expressing their natural concern for the safety of nearby children. 166
While there is some support for a finding that the officers were putting in-
nocently into words their pent-up worries and anxieties about the potential fate
of the young students, on balance it seems likely that the police intended their
conversation to elicit a response from the suspect. In support of the Court's
finding, it must be noted that the policemen never verbally confronted the
suspect with the problem, but instead kept it between themselves, although
they obviously were aware that Innis could overhear their conversation. Fur-
thermore, that the officers were told by their superior, Captain Leyden, "not
to question the respondent or intimidate or coerce him in any way,' 167 lends
credence to the Court's finding. In addition, Officers Gleckman and McKenna
' 59 446 U.S. at 302.
16° Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 297, 285 A.2d 172, 175.
161 384 U.S. at 445-58.
l'" 446 U.S. at 301 n.7. The Innis Court took great care to demonstrate that the only in-
tent behind the officers' conversation was to share their fears for the children. Id. at 302-03.
L61
164 Brief for Appellant at 25.
165 Rhode Island v, Innis, 446 U.S. 296. The court observed that "ftlhe police officers
in the wagon chose not to discuss sports or the weather but the crime for which the defendant was
arrested." R.I. at , 391 A.2d at 1162.
166 446 U.S. at 302-03.	 •
167
 Id. at 294.
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were young and relatively inexperienced, 168
 in comparison with the years of
on-the-job training of Officer Learning in Brewer. 169
Nevertheless, strong arguments can be made against the Court's conclu-
sion. First, classic interrogation techniques, such as appeals to the conscience,
are described in police interrogation manuals and are taught in basic police
training.'" The fact that an inexperienced policeman would know of and be
able to employ such techniques, therefore, should not be dismissed easily in
evaluating the underlying motive for the remarks made to a suspect such as In-
nis. Second, there are several aspects of Innis which suggest that the officers did
intend to elicit information. These include the officers' initiation of their con-
versation at the very commencement of the drive,'" knowing that the trip to
the central police station was a very brief one.'" This may indicate that the of-
ficers wished to make certain that Innis was made privy to their talk. Also,
although the Court concluded that the language used by the policemen was not
particularly evocative,'" it is rather difficult to imagine very much more
evocative material than that contained in the words and vivid imagery of Of-
ficer Gleckman's remarks.
Although intent to elicit information is not the determinative factor in the
Innis Court's definition of interrogation," 4
 a finding of such a purpose in this
case probably would have changed its result. While Justice Marshall's dissent
interpreted the Court's standard to embrace all deliberate attempts under the
penumbra of interrogation,'" the majority did not go this far.'" It is thus
possible that a deliberate attempt to elicit information would be excluded from
the Court's definition if the policemen involved concluded that their attempt
was "not reasonably likely" to obtain an incriminating response from the
suspect.'" A finding of intent, however, would certainly provide strong
evidence that the subjective elements necessary to constitute a Miranda inter-
rogation were indeed present.'" The intent to obtain incriminating evidence
need not be the sole or even the primary purpose behind the officers' words or
I " Brief for Appellant at 24.
169 Id. at 23.
"c' 446 U.S. at 314-15. Justice Stevens stated that "the practical experience embodied in
such manuals should not be ignored in a case such as this in which the record is devoid of any
evidence — one way or the other — as to the susceptibility of suspects in general or of Innis in
particular." Id. at 315.
'' See note 11 supra.
'" Id.
1 ' 446 U.S. at 303.
174 Id. at 301.
'" Id. at 305. Justice Marshall stated that the Miranda protections "apply whenever
police conduct is intended or likely to produce a response from a suspect in custody." Id. (emphasis
added).
176 Id. at 301-02. Justice Stewart only indicated that when a police practice is intended to
elicit incriminating information from the suspect, it is unlikely that this practice will not fall
under the Court's definition of interrogation. Id. at 301 n.7.
'" Id. at 301-02.
17$ Id. at 301 n.7.
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actions.'" For example, even if the Providence policemen's foremost concern in
attempting to gain information was to save children's lives, their remarks could
still constitute a Miranda interrogation so long as their remarks were likely to
elicit incriminating statements.
An examination of Inn'is shows, then, that the presence of certain tradi-
tional elements of an interrogation will not in all cases trigger the application of
Miranda protections. The facts of the case could conceivably have provided a
basis for the Court to affirm the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision either
on Brewer or Miranda grounds. Nevertheless, the Court chose to distinguish
Brewer, and to define narrowly the situations in which Miranda safeguards
would be available to a given suspect.
V. THE INNIS STANDARD — MIRANDA IN DECLINE
The definition of Miranda interrogation set forth in Innis portends a con-
tinuation of the Burger Court's less than amicable approach to the Miranda
decision. The signals here are somewhat more subtle than in cases such as Har-
ris and Tucker, as the issues presented for consideration in Innis require no open
"adjustment" of Miranda's language or constitutional underpinnings. The
thrust of Innis, however, is directly in line with most of the Court's other recent
decisions."' Although the Innis Court very briefly touched on the importance
of the perceptions of the suspect,' 82 the key element that actually determined
whether an interrogation had occurred was the policeman's evaluation of a given
suspect's perceptions and susceptibilities.'" Thus, as in Harris and Tucker, the
Burger Court was again approaching the difficulties inherent in a custodial
situation from a limited, police-oriented viewpoint as opposed to Miranda's
suspect-oriented perspective. Finally, the majority's application of its standard
to the specific circumstances of Innis indicated that the Court will continue to
interpret fact situations in Miranda-related cases in a light most favorable to the
law enforcement officers involved.'" It is apparent that under the Court's cur-
rent line of reasoning an accused criminal will face much difficulty in attempt-
ing to exclude important evidence on grounds of police deception or
psychological coercion.
The application of the Innis standard itself presents potentially large and
complex problems for lower courts in future litigation. For example, the Innis
decision provides no objective guidelines to determine whether, in a given case,
1 " Id. at 301-02.
150 Id.
"' See note 59 and text at notes 60-116 supra.
162 446 U.S. at 301.
1 " Id. at 302.
"4 Id. at 302-03. The Innis Court not only gave police the benefit of the doubt as to their
motives in initiating the conversation, but also found that the language they used was not
evocative. This suggests at the least that in cases of this type, any potential ambiguity in the facts
will be resolved in favor of the law enforcement officers. Id.
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the police should have known their behavior was reasonably likely to evoke in-
criminating statements.'" Additionally, the Court expressly noted that police
knowledge of a particular susceptibility of a defendant may be an important
factor' 86
 in ascertaining whether the standard is met. This suggests that the
Court intended its definition of a Miranda "interrogation" to be applied on a
case-by-case basis, with the particular eccentricities of each suspect and the
knowledge of each policeman involved to be determined and evaluated.
As Chief Justice Burger stressed in his concurring opinion,'" this ap-
proach may very well "introduce new elements of uncertainty"'" into the
evaluation of this type of case. Under the Innis decision, an officer must make a
kind of "snap judgment" in evaluating a suspect's mental state and possible
susceptibilities. This, of course, poses difficulties for police officers without any
professional training in psychology or psychiatry. Such evaluations are more
appropriately left to mental health professionals. It is suggested that police
would require more concrete guidelines in order to perform their jobs fairly and
efficiently. Innis also presents courts with the labyrinthine task of determining
an officer's immediate evaluation of a suspect's mental state at the time of his
or her arrest, an unenviable task at best.
Although it is impossible to predict how lower courts will apply this defini-
tion of interrogation, the Innis Court's rationale suggested that it will apply a
very narrow interpretation of what constitutes interrogation. In deciding that
Innis was not interrogated, the Court signaled that its standard affords police
considerable leeway in individual cases.'" As a result, only blatant police at-
tempts to exploit a suspect's peculiar weaknesses and susceptibilities will con-
vince the Court to find interrogation. Absent such unlikely and egregious cir-
cumstances, it is probable that the current Court will, as Justice Stevens sug-
gested in his dissent,' 9° "almost certainly exclude every police statement that is
not punctuated with a question mark from the concept of 'interrogation.' " 19 '
In addition to pointing out this fundamental flaw in the majority's opin-
ion, Justice Stevens articulated a standard of interrogation that was much more
faithful to the spirit of Miranda because it emphasized the suspect's perception
of the situation.' 92
 By incorporating the viewpoint of the reasonable suspect,'"
this definition would significantly discourage the police from infringing on the
rights of the accused. At the same time, however, it would not force the police
to be totally silent in the suspect's presence.'"
'" Id. at 302.
186 Id. n.8.
'" Id. at 304.
188 Id.
' 89 See note 184 supra.
19° 446 U.S. at 307.
' 91 Id. at 312.
192 Id. at 311. Justice Stevens perceptively pointed out that "[f]rom the suspect's point
of view the effectiveness of the warnings depends on whether it appears that the police are
scrupulously honoring his rights." Id. (emphasis added).
193 Id.
19. Id. The police could conceivably discuss a wide range of subjects without saying or
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While Justice Stevens's objective reasonable suspect standard is appealing
in theory, it nevertheless may be difficult to apply. Many criminal suspects,
whether in cases of violent crime or other situations, may not conform to the
description of the reasonable man. Justice Stevens's definition left unanswered
the question whether police may behave toward an unstable suspect in a man-
ner that would not elicit a response from a "reasonable suspect in the suspect's
position," 195 but probably elicit an incriminating response from this particular
individual. A given suspect may possess strong personal interests in a par-
ticular subject, as did the accused in Brewer v. Williams, or may have peculiar
mental weaknesses or lapses.' 96
 Clever police officers could exploit these
idiosyncracies, while still avoiding any actions to which a reasonable suspect
would have been expected to respond. A literal application of Justice Stevens's
definition could thus conceivably leave the door open to, and perhaps en-
courage, this type of police practice.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERROGATION STANDARD
Both the majority standard of Justice Stewart and that proposed by Justice
Stevens in his dissent present serious potential difficulties. The majority defini-
tion of interrogation is not only at odds with the spirit of Miranda, but it is also
extremely difficult to apply in practice. Justice Stevens's definition is more
philosophically reconcilable with the Miranda opinion, but presents its own
problems due to its "reasonable suspect" classification. Thus an alternative
standard is necessary. It would seem that a standard, incorporating Justice
Stevens's basic concept with a slight alteration, would provide the most fair
and practical definition of fifth amendment interrogation.
The most acceptable concept of a Miranda "interrogation" would include
any police conduct or statements that would appear to a reasonable person in
the suspect's position to call for a response, and any or all police conduct or
statements intended to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect,
regardless of whether or not a reasonable suspect would respond to such con-
duct or statements. This definition conforms with the basic Miranda principles,
as it places primacy on the custodial suspect's point of view, as opposed to the
perceptions of the police guarding that suspect. In addition, it precludes the
police from taking advantage of a suspect's unreasonable characteristics or
vulnerabilities. The standard would be relatively simple to implement, as
courts would have to make a subjective determination only in cases where
police conduct would not appear to a reasonable person in the suspect's posi-
tion to call for a response. Therefore, the standard would be both practical for
the courts to apply and would provide the degree of protection for the suspect
that Miranda dictated.
doing anything that would have "the same purpose or effect as a direct question" to the suspect.
Id, at 311.
195 id.
196 430 U.S. at 392. A reasonable person might not have responded to the Brewer
"Christian burial" speech with incriminating information. Nevertheless, an unstable individual
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Given the standard adopted by the Court in Innis, however, a defense at-
torney faced with a parallel situation in the future has limited options available
in attempting to suppress damaging evidence. He may attempt to suppress the
evidence by insisting that the suspect believed that he was being interrogated,
and for that reason volunteered incriminating information. This approach,
however, is most likely futile in light of the Innis Court's emphasis on the police
viewpoint. Thus, the attorney's strongest potential argument under Innis is to
stress that the police should know that the ordinary suspect is emotionally
moved by the plight of particularly vulnerable individuals, such as children
and handicapped people. Only if the defense clearly demonstrated that the
police had exploited a suspect's normal sensitivities, would an interrogation be
invalidated on fifth amendment grounds. Thus, the Court has almost com-
pletely eliminated any practical effect that Miranda once had in excluding
evidence of questionable interrogations from the courtroom.
CONCLUSION
In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court defined fifth amendment inter-
rogation in a subjective, police-oriented manner. This decision marked a con-
tinuation of the Burger Court's desire to limit Miranda to the greatest degree
possible. The controversial Miranda decision, once believed to provide
definitive guidelines in determining the nature of future police interrogations,
has been drained of most of its import by the current Court. Innis places the
criminal suspect in an extremely precarious position in the custodial situation,
as the Court places a premium on police evaluation of the accused's mental
condition at the time of arrest. Although the Court attempted in Innis to
enhance the position of law enforcement officials, its decision creates difficulties
for police, in having to make on the spot assessments of the suspect's sen-
sitivities. Moreover, a burden is placed on the courts in having to determine
what the police should have known at the time of the interrogation. The resolu-
tion of these problems can only come from future litigation involving the ap-
plication of the Innis definition of interrogation. The Court itself, however,
may not view these problems as significant. Rather, such difficulties may be
mitigated by the current Court's indication that the definition of interrogation
will be applied in specifically defined situations. Thus, it appears that the effect
of Innis is to characterize only direct questions and overt attempts to procure in-
formation as interrogation.
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with unusually strong religious feelings did so respond. Id. It is, therefore, possible that a literal
reading of Justice Stevens's standard would not include Detective Learning's remarks in that
case. Id.
